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The Effects of Corporate and Country Sustainability 
Characteristics on the Cost of Debt: An International 
Investigation 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: We investigate the relationship between corporate and country sustainability on the cost of 
bank loans. We look into 470 loan agreements signed between 2005 and 2012 with borrowers based in 28 
different countries across the world and operating in all major industries. Our principal findings reveal 
that country sustainability, relating to both social and environmental frameworks, has a statistically and 
economically impactful effect on direct financing of economic activity. An increase of one unit in a 
country’s sustainability score is associated with an average decrease in the cost of debt by 64 basis points. 
Our international analysis shows that the environmental dimension of a country’s institutional framework 
is approximately twice as impactful as the social dimension, when it comes to determining the cost of 
corporate loans. On the other hand, we find no conclusive evidence that firm-level sustainability 
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influences the interest rates charged to borrowing firms by banks. Our main findings survive a battery of 
robustness tests and additional analyses concerning subsamples, alternative sustainability metrics, and the 
effects of financial crisis. 
Keywords: corporate social responsibility; CSR; CSP; sustainability; banking; financial contracts; culture; 
loans; international 
 
JEL Classification: G14, G32, M14  
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate social responsibility1 (CSR) has firmly established itself as a crucial notion for modern business 
and society on an international level. Consumers, environmentalists, employees, activists, and concerned 
citizens have been pushing corporations for many years to go beyond their purely economic goals and 
attempt to improve their impact on society and the natural environment in broader ways. The latest 
Nielsen Global Survey on Corporate Social Responsibility2 was conducted in 2013 with 29,000 
                                                          
1
 Concisely described by the European Commission as a concept whereby “companies are taking 
responsibility for their impact on society,” http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-
730_en.htm. 
 
2
 http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/press-room/2013/nielsen-50-percent-of-global-consumers-surveyed-willing-
to-pay-more-fo.html 
 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
5 
respondents from 58 countries and demonstrates that at least 50% of global consumers are willing to pay 
a premium for goods and services coming from socially responsible firms. The trend is for this percentage 
to keep rising as it has from the previous related survey conducted by Nielsen in 2011. Thus, societal 
pressure moves from the area of implicit reputational gains to explicit financial incentives for responsible 
producers and, vice versa, the lack of socially responsible practices (or even worse, the engagement in 
social/environmental controversies) constitutes a competitive disadvantage. This is also recognized by the 
European Commission’s renewed strategy for CSR (2011–-2014), according to which CSR “can bring 
benefits in terms of risk management, cost savings, access to capital, customer relationships, human 
resource management, and innovation capacity.”3  
The traditional view of CSR used to be that it constituted a misallocation and misappropriation of 
valuable resources in order for managers to promote their own ethical agenda (Friedman, 1970) or that, at 
best, it has an insignificant effect on a firm’s financial performance, as there are too many confounding 
factors to observe a statistically strong direct impact (Ullmann, 1985). However this perception does not 
seem to be held as strongly in today’s business world. According to the UN Global Compact–Accenture 
CEO Study on Sustainability4, conducted in 2013 with the participation of more than 1,000 top executives 
from 27 industries and 103 countries, 93% of respondents saw sustainability issues as an important or 
very important factor for the future success of their business.  
It is, therefore, unsurprising that considerable research efforts have been made to identify the details of 
the association between CSR and financial performance of individual firms, as well as portfolios of assets. 
The conceptual breadth and methodological diversity characterizing this extensive literature over a span 
                                                          
3 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-730_en.htm 
 
4 https://acnprod.accenture.com/~/media/Accenture/Conversion-
Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/PDF/Strategy_5/Accenture-UN-Global-Compact-Acn-CEO-
Study-Sustainability-2013.pdf 
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of 40 years has led to contradictory evidence being brought forward by hundreds of empirical studies. 
Nevertheless, both qualitative reviews (Margolis and Walsh, 2003) and statistical meta-analyses (Orlitzky 
et al., 2003; Margolis et al., 2009) hint at a modest but statistically significant correlation between the two 
concepts.5 The underlying arguments in favor of this positive link between CSR and firm performance 
can be broadly categorized in two groups. The first one draws from instrumental stakeholder theory 
(Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995) and posits that the efficient implementation of CSR policies and practices 
can lead to effective stakeholder management on the part of the firm. Establishing mutually beneficial 
long-term relationships with key constituents can bring about the generation of multiple comparative 
advantages for the firm, both in terms of improved profitability (Clarkson, 1995; Hillman and Keim, 
2001) and better risk management (Godfrey, 2005). In other words, building trusting relationships with 
primary stakeholders by addressing their legitimate needs and concerns (ideally on a proactive basis), 
through CSR, creates reputational wealth and relational capital for the firm and can ultimately lead to an 
improved corporate valuation or to the preservation of value during turbulent times.  
A second line of reasoning commonly used to support a positive association between CSR and firm 
performance is often referred to as “the good management hypothesis” (Alexander and Buchholz, 1978; 
Waddock and Graves, 1997).  This hypothesis suggests that high levels of sustainable business 
practices can be viewed as signaling supremely competent and trustworthy corporate managers. The 
effective application of CSR is a very complex task that requires the consideration of the relative 
importance of claims made by a plethora of different stakeholder groups (often contradicting each other) 
and the estimation of both explicit and implicit costs and benefits accruing from the related practices to 
                                                          
5 However, when focusing either on fund performance (Kreander et al., 2005) or index performance 
(Schröder, 2007), there are usually no significant differences to be found between the performance of 
conventional and socially responsible investing (SRI) funds. And this is despite SRI funds being true to 
their name and investing in more sustainable firms compared to their conventional peers (Kempf and 
Osthoff, 2008).  
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the firm. Consequently, executives who choose to use CSR for strategic purposes can be viewed as being 
highly skilled. 
Interestingly, although the aforementioned arguments can be used to motivate research on the financial 
impacts of CSR on either the equity or debt valuation of the firm, the majority of relevant studies focus 
on identifying the influence of CSR on the cost of equity capital (Kempf and Osthoff, 2007; Galema et 
al., 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; El Ghoul et al., 2011). It has only been in the last few years that 
some attention has been paid to the possibility of a linkage between CSR and cost of debt. The sheer size 
of the corporate debt market and its importance on a global scale merits such investigations. According to 
McKinsey, as of 2012, global equity is estimated to aggregate to $50 trillion, whereas total corporate debt 
amounts to $86 trillion.6 An additional reason to motivate such research comes from the view that 
distinguishing good management via a firm’s CSR levels is even more important in the debt markets due 
to the agency conflicts arising between shareholders and debt-holders (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). 
Merton’s (1973) seminal work has demonstrated that the payoffs accruing from a corporate bond (the 
extension to corporate loans is straightforward) are asymmetric and resemble that of a put position. This 
is because the potential benefits for the borrower are capped at the level of accruing interest payments, 
whereas the potential losses can be as much as the entirety of the borrowed capital. In contrast, for 
shareholders, the gains are potentially unlimited. This distinction makes the imperative to identify 
competent and responsible firm managers in order to reduce agency and monitoring costs more 
important for debt-holders than for equity-holders. 
It should also be noted that from the $86 trillion of outstanding, global corporate debt, $75 trillion (or 
approximately 87%) relates to securitized or non-securitized bank loans, and $11 trillion is connected to 
outstanding corporate bonds. Bradley and Roberts (2004) also report that private debt, including bank 
                                                          
6
 McKinsey Global Institute analysis, available online at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/ 
global_capital_markets/financial_globalization. 
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loans, tends to be at least two to three times the amount of public debt. Apart from their differences in 
order of magnitude, the role of banking institutions as “quasi insiders” (Goss and Roberts, 2011) provides 
a basis to assert that the loan market is more efficient than the bond market and, as such, the financial 
effects of CSR will be more prominently exhibited there. Banks have access to unique information related 
to a firm’s operational and financial standing, a specialized skill set to appropriately assess this 
information in order to make a lending decision, and the privilege of being able to set the terms regarding 
the monitoring of the borrower during the duration of the loan. Therefore, it seems sensible to expect a 
greater degree of market efficiency in the corporate loans market. Altman et al. (2010) have in fact 
concluded that syndicated loan markets are more informationally efficient compared to bond markets, as 
they manage to reflect the probability of default more quickly. 
Based on the above, it is surprising to find that more emphasis has not been given in the academic 
literature to the likely impact of CSR on the cost of internal debt financing, i.e., through bond issuance, 
compared to the effects of CSR on external debt financing, i.e., through bank lending. Not only is this 
part of the empirical literature scarce in terms of the overall number of studies, it is also underdeveloped 
in a variety of ways, as we will demonstrate in our perusal of related research in the next section of this 
paper. We posit that CSR leads to reduced corporate default risk − which is what lending institutions 
ultimately price − and, consequently, to lower cost of debt. We aim to extend previous work on the 
financial impacts of CSR by: (i) focusing on the link between CSR and cost of debt (which has not been 
extensively researched, unlike the cost of equity), and more specifically on the cost of bank loans (which 
have received less attention compared to financing through bond issuance), (ii) providing an international 
framework of analysis using a sample of borrowers from 28 countries around the globe, instead of 
focusing solely on US and European firms, (iii) linked to the previous point, connecting the cost of loans 
not just to CSR performance indicators at the firm level but also to country-related sustainability scores 
that assess the respective institutional frameworks, (iv) going beyond looking purely at aggregate CSR 
scores and identifying possible variability in the financial impacts of particular CSR dimensions and 
subdimensions, (v) chronologically extending previous analyses in order to include evidence from the 
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years of the global credit crisis, which may have altered the nature or strength of the CSR–cost of debt 
link.  
Our main results are indicative of the complexity and variability of the economic impacts of CSR on the 
cost of debt. We find that the sustainability framework of a borrower’s country, and every dimension 
making up this framework, is significantly negatively related to corporate borrowing costs. An increase by 
one unit in the overall country sustainability metric that we utilize leads to a significant average decrease 
of 69 basis points in our sample (or 52% in average corporate loan spread over LIBOR). The intuitive 
explanation is that these institutional mechanisms act as a shield for the borrowing firm, protecting it 
from the operational and reputational hazards occurring from systemic social and environmental 
challenges and ultimately reducing its default risk. On the other hand, improved overall performance in 
CSR terms is not shown to be associated with the cost of bank loans, and particular elements of CSR 
even appear to be positively linked to credit costs. When extending our analysis to the various 
components of sustainability, we provide evidence that the environmental aspect of country sustainability 
is more financially impactful than the social. A unitary increase in the former leads to an average decrease 
in the corporate cost of debt by approximately 80 basis points compared with approximately 50 basis 
points for an equivalent decrease in the latter. These results are consistent when looking at various 
subcategories within each dimension of country sustainability. The model specifications we use to 
conduct our investigation include an extensive array of country, industry, borrower, lender, and facility 
characteristics, explain approximately 50% of corporate loan spread variability, and provide economically 
intuitive results with regard to the sign and value of known cost of debt determinants. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a summary of the extant literature 
and the conceptual basis guiding our empirical tests. Section 3 outlines the data sources that have been 
used and the methodology implemented, while Section 4 describes the results of our analyses. Section 5 
discusses the practical importance of the inferences that can be drawn and makes suggestions for further 
research in this area. 
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2. RELATED LITERATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 
When assessing the credit quality of an institution seeking to borrow funds, the traditional approach of 
banks has been to base this assessment on reasonably objective data that is quantitative, easily verifiable 
by third parties, and which is usually financial in nature (e.g., profitability, current operational leverage, 
liquidity, market value, and credit ratings assigned by rating agencies). This emphasis on “hard 
information” is the defining characteristic of “transaction-based banking” (Gropp et al., 2013). In 
contrast,  the lending decisions for “relationship banking” are based not only on the above, but also on 
“information which is harder to accurately summarize in a numeric score” (Petersen, 2004), and which is 
often collected in person, difficult to verify by third parties, and more subjective in nature (e.g., 
managerial competence, trustworthiness, and innovative thinking), or “soft information.” As Goetzmann 
et al. (2007) note, there is no single, clear definition of what the term “soft information” precisely 
captures, so the distinction between hard and soft information is made by noting the above 
characteristics. This somewhat contrasts with the growing literature that shows that the use of non-
financial factors (commonly captured by soft information) can lead to more accurate predictions of 
corporate credit quality, compared with the sole use of purely financial factors (Grunert et al., 2005). 
We posit that a firm’s CSR or sustainability performance falls under the umbrella of soft information that 
banks may consider when taking lending decisions.7 We have already noted that stakeholder theory 
                                                          
7
 The development of multiple ratings and numeric scores that are used as proxies of CSR may seem to 
go against this statement. However, these are really what Petersen (2004) refers to as “hardened soft 
information” instead of hard information per se. Although they have been quantified, the nature of the 
related data collection process and score assignment makes them much more subjective compared with, 
for example, standard accounting ratios. 
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(Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995) suggests that improved corporate social performance can lead to better 
stakeholder management, which can, in turn, materialize into a more reliable and effective business 
model, thus creating strategic comparative advantages and positively influencing the firm’s financial 
performance. In the case of the cost of bank loans in particular, a case can be made that CSR8 will have a 
direct influence on a variety of factors which determine credit costs. In the following paragraphs, we 
analyze the link between sustainability and each of these factors, drawing from the arguments and 
conclusions of previous research.  
CSR is a widely used but poorly defined concept. Carroll and Shabana (2010) provide an anthology about 
the notion of CSR and Dahlsrud (2008) analyses 37 definitions. The latter detects that five dimensions 
appear to play a role in most definitions, namely “environment,” “economics,” “social,” “stakeholders,” 
and “voluntary.” Porter and Kramer (2006) try to substantiate the business case for CSR and illustrate 
various links between competitive advantages of firms and CSR. CSR is closely connected with the notion 
of sustainability or sustainable development (Simionescu, 2015). Sustainability is a concept that refers to 
the potential of societies to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the next 
generations to meet their needs. This concept too has no clear definition (Lélé, 1991). It relates to the 
interaction between economic development, social development, environmental quality, and issues of 
fairness or equity. In general, sustainability and sustainable development connect with societal 
development, whereas CSR relates to development at the level of individual organizations. In order to 
come to grips with both concepts, ratings and rankings have been used, but there appear to be 
fundamental issues in adequately measuring them (see Chatterji et al., 2009, for CSR and Hanley et al., 
1999, for sustainability). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
8 For the sake of clarity, we would like to note that all subsequent references to CSR and sustainability in 
this paper refer specifically to CSR performance and not CSR disclosures. The development of 
hypotheses and empirical analyses are centered around what firms actually do instead of what they report 
they do in terms of CSR. 
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Recent findings coming from the empirical CSR literature have demonstrated the existence of a link 
between improved CSR and reduced information asymmetry. Cui et al. (2012) take the view of Jo and 
Harjoto (2011, 2012), who posit that firms use CSR engagements as a mechanism to increase 
informational flow and improve communication to non-investing stakeholders, thereby enhancing 
conflict resolution and decreasing information asymmetries. Their study pays special attention to the 
possible endogeneity existing between CSR and information asymmetry and concludes that the causality 
of the relationship runs from the former to the latter. In a similar vein, Cho et al. (2013) present findings 
in favor of a negative association between CSR and information asymmetry (as shown in proxy by stock 
bid–ask spreads). They argue that this is due to the tendency of CSR to be connected with increased 
voluntary disclosures which reveal management’s ethical concerns and improve the transparency and 
reliability of financial reporting. The conceptual link between information asymmetry and the cost of 
bank loans is somewhat more obvious. The higher and better quality the informational flow is between 
two contracting parties, the lower the monitoring, policing, and agency costs tend to be and thus the 
lower the overall cost of bank financing (Akerlof, 1970; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Mankiw, 1986). In 
addition, the study of Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) clearly demonstrates that increased informational 
transparency leads to increased “saleability” of a debt contract. 
CSR has also been connected with trustworthiness, integrity, non-opportunistic behavior, and an 
indication of the underlying moral character of a firm. Jones (1995, p.412) notes that “There is another 
way to reduce opportunistic behavior, however – the voluntary adoption of standards of behavior that 
limit or eliminate it” and discretionary CSR engagements certainly fit this description. Godfrey (2005) 
argues that certain aspects of CSR can be viewed as legitimate indications of corporate benevolence and 
can generate positive moral capital as stakeholders feel they can genuinely trust the corporation. Yoon et 
al. (2006) also show that CSR activities can improve a company’s public image and make it seem more 
trustworthy to consumers, so long as it can convincingly demonstrate that it focuses on CSR per se and 
not on CSR advertising.  
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
13 
Although trust is a central issue in the world of finance and banking, its effects on financial decision-
making have not been researched extensively until recently (Sapienza, 2009). In the context of lending 
decisions made by banks, trust is mostly related to the ‘‘willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important 
to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party’’ (Mayer et al., 1995, p.712). 
The trustor in this case is the bank and the expected action is the full and timely repayment of the loan 
subject to the terms of the contract. Indications of opportunistic behavior on the part of the borrower 
would lead to greater mistrust by the lender and, consequently, to a need for more stringent monitoring 
and higher screening and enforcement costs, which increase the effective cost of debt. Karlan (2007) 
shows that cultural similarity and geographic proximity have significant effects in group lending 
outcomes. He argues that socially connected individuals may trust and value their relationships more and 
that they share information more easily, thus lowering the respective costs. Most notably, Kim et al. 
(2014) also highlight the importance of trust in financial decisions, and lending in particular, and argue 
that it is dependent on two characteristics of the borrower, as perceived by the lender, namely integrity 
and benevolence (Howorth and Moro, 2012). They base their arguments and empirical investigation on 
the work of Mayer et al. (1995), who define benevolence as “the extent to which a trustee is believed to 
want to do good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive” (p.718) and integrity as a concept 
that “involves the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds 
acceptable” (p.719). 
Ultimately, the overarching argument posits that the link between sustainability and the 
trustworthiness/integrity/non-opportunism of the borrowing firm influences the levels of default risk 
that the firm is subject to and, through this mechanism, also impacts the corporate cost of debt. One of 
the most important links connecting corporate sustainability (or responsibility as it is usually called at the 
micro level of the firm) with default risk is quality of management. In the words of Goss (2009): 
“Stakeholder theorists argue that firms that are able to negotiate the intricacies of competing economic, 
social and governance agendas are likely endowed with higher quality managers.” Thus, firm managers 
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that can consistently apply sustainable principles in corporate operations are viewed as both capable (due 
to the inherent complexity of this task) and trustworthy. And given that it is well established that a firm’s 
distress and ultimate failure is predominantly a result of managerial incompetence (Altman and Hotchkiss, 
2006), it stands to reason that higher levels of CSR will lead to lower risk of default. Oikonomou et al. 
(2014) provide support to this rationale by showing that for a cross-industrial sample of US firms, higher 
scores of aggregate measures of CSR strengths (concerns) lead to higher (lower) S&P bond ratings − a 
proxy for credit/default risk − as well as lower (higher) levels of credit spreads. Their findings remain 
qualitatively similar when they look at individual dimensions of CSR (environment, relationship with local 
communities, employee rights and others). Furthermore, Goss (2009) focuses exclusively on the link 
between CSR and default risk. His study finds a significant negative relationship between CSR scores (via 
the KLD STATS database) and financial distress, as measured by the probability of default from the 
Merton (1974) model. The result is robust to the endogeneity of CSR investments and firm profitability, 
with CSR remaining negatively associated to the probability of default in a system of simultaneous 
nonlinear equations.  
The above arguments substantiating the linkages between sustainability and “soft characteristics” 
(trustworthiness, integrity, benevolence, non-opportunistic behavior) of the borrower and between these 
characteristics and loan terms have been analyzed mainly at the level of the firm. However, there is 
important scholarly work that extends the framework of analysis to the level of the country where the 
firm is based. In a very interesting study, Cai et al. (2014) find that differences in investments in CSR are 
associated with various aspects of country socio-economic development and culture including, among 
others, civil liberties, political rights, levels of autonomy and individualism, and levels of corruption. More 
recently, Breuer et al. (2015) find that the negative relationship between CSR and corporate cost of equity 
is stronger in those countries where legal protection of investors is high.  
In addition, the relationship between culture and economic behavior has been established in regards to 
very different phenomena. Bottazzi et al. (2007) find the extent to which venture capitalists fund certain 
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entrepreneurs, and the terms of this funding, is significantly dependent on how much they trust citizens 
of these countries according to their cultural traits. Licht et al. (2011) also look into the financial effects of 
cross-country cultural differences (with a focus on egalitarianism) and find it materially affects the 
international flows of equity and debt, as well as the mergers and acquisitions activity between countries. 
Furthermore, Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) show that when lead banks consider the borrower to be 
culturally distant from them, they apply higher interest rates on the loans and are more likely to demand 
third-party guarantees. The authors argue that culture plays an important role in the effectiveness of the 
communications between lender and borrower as well as the organizational structure of the latter, hence 
influencing the terms of the loan.  
In summary, there are ample conceptual linkages, supported by empirical evidence, between CSR and 
country and/or borrower features and between these features and the cost of debt. CSR reduces 
informational asymmetries between the contracting parties, increases trust by increasing the perceived 
integrity, benevolence, and trustworthiness of the borrower, and reduces the expectations of 
opportunistic behavior taking place. By doing so, it leads to reductions in monitoring, policing, and 
bonding costs, an overall reduced default risk, and consequently a lower cost of debt. Thus, the principal 
hypotheses our study investigates are: 
Hypothesis 1: The overall sustainability framework of a borrower’s country is inversely associated with the borrower’s cost of 
direct financing. 
Hypothesis 2: The corporate sustainability characteristics of a borrowing firm are inversely associated with its direct cost of 
financing. 
Going a step further, we attempt to look into the likely difference in the financial impact of separate 
dimensions of sustainability, namely the social and environmental dimensions. Godfrey et al. (2009) have 
argued that combining distinct features of sustainability to create “a single, monolithic construct” (Godfrey et. 
al, 2009, p.426) actually dilutes the observable financial effects of unidimensional CSR. While the 
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environmental aspect of sustainability has frequently been studied separately and found to be positively 
related to different aspects of a firm’s financial performance (Belkaoui, 1976; Blacconiere and Northcut, 
1997; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; Bauer and Hann, 2010), the social dimension is usually “hidden” by 
being a constituent of aggregated measures of sustainability (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Hillman and 
Keim, 2001; Nelling and Webb, 2009), while there are also occasions when it has been shown to exhibit a 
less significant and even negative influence on corporate financial performance (Ziegler et al., 2007). This 
may be connected to Clarkson’s (1995) view that corporations attempting to deal with broad social issues 
instead of targeting concerns of primary stakeholder groups will not see any sizeable corresponding effect 
on their bottom line. 
Furthermore, the environmental impacts of firm activities have been acknowledged as crucially important 
for many decades and efforts have been made to monitor and regulate firms in this regard. For example, 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency was created in 1970 with the purpose of writing 
regulation to protect the environment, enforcing this regulation via fines and sanctions to corporate 
transgressors, and promoting energy conservation efforts on the part of firms. In the same direction, the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 is 
concerned with liability and compensation for hazardous substances released into the environment by 
corporations or individuals, and the associated clean-up and emergency response. Given such 
institutional/governmental recognition of the importance of the environmental outputs of firms, the 
existence of related regulatory frameworks and the subsequent penalization of lawbreaking entities, it 
would be reasonable to expect that firms with a better environmental performance have more effective 
business models, as they are able to avoid fines, sanctions, clean-up costs, lengthy judicial battles, as well 
as the effects of all the negativity publicity manifesting from such events and hurting their bottom line. 
Naturally, we expect that all of the above will lead to lower default risk and to banks lending to these 
firms at a lower rate. 
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On the other hand, social aspects of CSR are much more diverse in nature, less integrated within national 
legal and regulatory systems, less easy to quantify and harder to demonstrate that they are consistently 
institutionally supported or violated by firms. Under the umbrella of the social impacts of firms can be 
found issues pertaining to staff safety; safeguarding of civil and political rights of employees, suppliers, 
and customers; product responsibility; and non-discrimination and equality in the workplace. While there 
are laws and initiatives about most of these aspects in most countries around the globe (for example, the 
Equal Pay Act in the USA and the Diversity Management Initiatives organized by the European 
Commission in the EU are related to equality in the workplace), it is harder for the underlying principles 
to be institutionalized and implemented by firms and equally hard for national and international 
organizations to verify adherence or violation of these rules. Because of this added degrees of ambiguity 
and fragmentation, banks may not be as likely to recognize corporate social risks being as important as 
corporate environmental risks. Overall, we expect that maintaining a high level of responsibility with 
regards to social issues will improve employee attraction and retention, increase customer loyalty levels, 
strengthen the links between the firm and local communities, and help avoid fines and sanctions related 
to violations of related regulations. However, we also expect that the impact on default risk and cost of 
debt will not be as noticeable as in the case of corporate environmental performance.  
To wrap up, we anticipate that within the framework of this study: 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of the environmental dimension of firm and country sustainability on the cost of borrowing will be 
stronger than the respective impact of the social dimension. 
In spite of the substantial foundation provided by the aforementioned, the literature specifically 
concerned with the effects of CSR on the cost of bank loans is scarce. Goss and Roberts (2011) were 
among the first to explore this link. Their study focuses on the US bank loan market from 1991 to 2006, 
thus stopping before the start of the global financial crisis. They provide evidence that, overall, firms 
considered to be less responsible pay a modest premium ranging between 7 and 18 basis points over 
more responsible ones. However, the financial effects of discretionary CSR investments are more 
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equivocal. When splitting their sample according to borrower quality, the authors show that low-quality 
borrowers engaging in discretionary CSR practices face higher loan spreads and shorter maturities, 
whereas lenders are unaffected in their decision regarding high-quality borrowers’ engagements in 
discretionary CSR. 
On the other hand, Nandy and Lodh (2012) solely examine the effects of the environmental dimension of 
sustainability on bank lending decisions. Their sample comprises US firms exclusively and covers loan 
facilities agreed between 1991 and 2006. They establish that more eco-friendly firms, on average, tend to 
agree less costly loans on more favorable contractual terms with banks. In addition, the total amount and 
duration of the loans seem to be positively associated with the borrower’s environmental performance. 
The economic significance of their results concerning cost of debt is rather small, as a unitary increase in 
corporate environmental scores is associated with a drop of average spreads of merely 8 basis points.  
Lastly, Kim et al. (2014) conduct an international analysis specifically aimed at revealing the impact of 
ethical behavior (and not sustainability or CSR more broadly) on the cost of syndicated loans. They use a 
sample covering loan agreements related to 19 different countries for the period 2003 to 2007. Their 
overarching results suggest a significant reduction of loan rates, approximately 25% in the mean spread, 
associated with increases of one standard deviation in the degree of borrower’s ethical behavior. 
Furthermore, the authors provide indications that ethical compatibility between borrower and lender can 
lead to further reductions in bank loan rates. Their principal conclusions survive an array of robustness 
tests and alternative specifications.  
As can be seen, previous studies on the effects of sustainability are restricted in terms of either geographic 
coverage (with Goss and Roberts, 2011, and Nandy and Lodh, 2012, focusing only in the US), or in the 
aspects of CSR they examine (Nandy and Lodh, 2012, on environment; Kim et al., 2014, on business 
ethics) or in the time frame of their dataset (none goes beyond 2007 and thus they do not account for the 
possible influences of the global credit crisis on the investigated phenomena). Our study aims to fill these 
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gaps and is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to also look into the effects of country sustainability on 
the cost of indirect corporate financing.  
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
Our measures of country and corporate sustainability are provided by Oekom research AG (simply 
referred to as Oekom hereafter). Oekom has established itself as one of the leading independent 
sustainability rating agencies globally, currently covering more than 3,400 corporations worldwide and 
acting as partner to a multitude of financial service providers and institutional investors. The agency’s 
rating system is based on a comprehensive framework created through the dynamic assessment of more 
than 100 indicators, which are used to generate both country and company sustainability ratings. Ratings 
are produced for the overall country/company sustainability, as well as for the social and environmental 
performance dimensions separately. The ratings scale for overall sustainability ranges from D– (poor 
performance) to A+(excellent performance) but a more precise numeric scale is also produced and ranges from 
1 (poor performance) to 4 (excellent performance) and from 0 to 4 for the various sustainability subcategories. In 
the evaluation process, Oekom uses information that has been created by the firm (i.e., corporate 
disclosures), as well as information that has been generated by external sources. Recognizing that different 
industries are sensitive to different key factors, can lead to the creation of diverse types of social and 
environmental externalities and thus can be more prone to be affiliated with dissimilar kinds of 
controversies, Oekom applies an industry-specific weighting scheme to the various indicators it uses. 
Thus, this approach effectively leads to the generation of best-in-class sustainability ratings and scores. 
Additional information about the subcategories of social and environmental indicators used by Oekom to 
rate companies and countries can be found in the Appendix of this paper.  
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Oekom’s international coverage of firms, along with its highly sophisticated rating methodology, lead to 
the creation of an extensive database that is characterized by reliable and replicable quantitative measures 
of firm and country sustainability. These characteristics are highly desirable for conducting empirical 
research in the area and thus increasingly more academics have decided to make use of Oekom instead of 
alternative CSR sources (Schreck, 2011; Sun et al., 2011). We follow this recent trend and use: (i) the 
annual numeric scores for the overall sustainability of countries and firms; (ii) the scores for the social and 
environmental sustainability dimensions; and (iii) the scores for the various subdimensions within them9 
as our key independent variables. Our Oekom dataset starts in 2005, ends in 2012 and comprises 
observations for 5,242 firm-years, for which we have numeric scores in each and every one of the 
aforementioned categories. 
We use the Thomson Reuters DealScan database (referred to as DealScan hereafter) to draw information 
about the characteristics of the loan contracts, lenders, and borrowers. Our proxy for the cost of bank 
loans is the logarithm of the spread of the loan interest rate over LIBOR, adding any annual (or facility) 
fee paid to the lender (or lending group), and it is measured in basis points for each dollar drawn down. 
Based on related previous literature on the determinants of bank loans (Goss and Roberts, 2011; Fields et 
al., 2012; Giannetti and Yafeh, 2012; Nandy and Lodh, 2012; Kim et al., 2014), we draw a variety of 
information from DealScan concerning borrowing companies to construct our set of control variables: 
firm size (book value of total assets), ratio of market value of equity versus book value of equity, leverage 
(book value of total debt over book value of total equity), profitability (return on equity), interest 
coverage ratio (earnings before interest and taxes over interest expenses), firm liquidity (book value of 
current assets over book value of current liabilities), percentage of free floating shares, financial distress 
                                                          
9 The social dimension is subdivided into “staff and suppliers,” “society and product responsibility,” and 
“corporate governance and business ethics,” while the environmental dimension is subdivided into the 
“environmental management,” “products and services,” and “eco-efficiency.” 
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(Altman Z-score) and R&D intensity (Research & Development expenses over total sales). We 
additionally collect the book value of total assets as a proxy for lender size (or the average of total assets 
when there are multiple lenders in a syndicated loan) and the total loan maturity (in months) from 
DealScan.  
We also make use of the information provided by Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bloomberg to add 
borrower and lender credit ratings to our model specification. We use credit ratings provided by Standard 
and Poor’s or Moody’s, if the former is not available, and translate them to a numeric scale following a 
rationale similar to that applied by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) and Oikonomou et al. (2014). To 
account for the possibility that rating agencies already include an assessment of sustainability among the 
extensive array of factors they consider when assigning corporate credit ratings, we regress credit scores 
on the respective Oekom scores and use the residuals of these regressions in our main model 
specifications. We also calculate firm betas using stock returns and corresponding MSCI country index 
returns from Datastream. We use monthly data for a five year period to conduct the calculations. Lastly, 
in order to account for the most important economic characteristics of borrower countries,10 we include 
real GDP growth in the years the loan facility was signed, provided by Datastream, and a binary variable 
taking a value of 0 when a country is classified as “Developed” by FTSE and 1 otherwise. Table 1 
contains brief descriptions of all the above variables. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                          
10 We elect to follow this process instead of using a series of binary variables for every country where a 
borrower is located in order to keep the model as parsimonious as possible and so that the importance of 
the country sustainability scores is not artificially subverted. 
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We follow Francis et al. (2012) and use loan facilities as the level of analysis thus creating a cross-section 
of loan-year observations.11 After matching Oekom with DealScan using ISINs and manual comparison 
of names, add credit rating information from Datastream and Bloomberg by conducting a thorough 
manual search, deleting double entries and excluding data points due to missing observations, we reach a 
final sample comprising 470 loan-year observations in our complete model specification. This is a sample 
rich in the diversity of regional characteristics, as it includes borrowing firms from 28 different countries 
from every continent except Africa. Furthermore, all major industries are represented. Table 2 provides 
additional details on sample characteristics by breaking down the number of observations per borrower 
country, region, and industry and by year that the loan agreement was signed.  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
It is worth comparing generic data coverage of this paper with those of the few previous relevant studies. 
In terms of corporate sustainability databases, both Goss and Roberts (2011) and Nandy and Lodh (2012) 
make use of KLD thus only studying the US market between 1990 and 2006. KLD is one of the most 
established sources of CSR data employed in empirical research, though it has some important 
limitations: the indicators for assessing sustainability dimensions are binary (thus only indicative of 
presence or absence and not degree of certain characteristics) and the produced scores are not industry 
adjusted to reflect the key importance of different sustainability dimensions for different lines of business. 
Kim et al. (2014) on the other hand use Sustainalytics which allows them to create a sample covering 19 
countries but for a shorter time period, namely between 2003 and 2007. Nandy and Lodh (2012) only 
                                                          
11 We make this choice in order to retain a sizeable sample. This disallows us from using panel estimation 
techniques but as Kim et al. (2014) demonstrate, it should not make a difference to our core results 
regarding the effects of sustainability on cost of debt. 
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look at the environmental component of sustainability and Kim et al. (2014) limit the analysis to business 
ethics. Due to the databases used, none of these studies has access to country-level sustainability scores to 
include in their analysis concerning likely impact on cost of bank loans. In contrast, our study uses the 
international Oekom sustainability database thus incorporating loan observations from 28 different 
countries across the world between 2005 and 2012 (hence also including years into the financial crisis). It 
looks into both the social and environmental dimensions of CSR and their components, and is also the 
first to include country sustainability metrics within this research framework.  
More quantitative information about the identity of the borrowers, lenders and loans is contained in 
Table 3. Mean and median scores for borrowers’ overall CSR scores as well as for the respective 
environmental and social dimensions are close to 2.1 to 2.2 with modest, but not trivial, standard 
deviations of approximately 0.4 to 0.5. It is worth noting that in the only other relevant international 
study (Kim et al., 2014), the variability of the sustainability (ethics) variable was low, as the mean score 
was 70.55 and the standard deviation merely 3.65. Consequently, we believe that despite the smaller 
sample size, our study makes use of a rich and variable international data pool.  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
While there are firm-year observations for which CSR scores take the absolute minimum possible value 
(1), there is no single observation in the sample  of a firm scoring perfectly (4) in the overall CSR, the 
social dimension or the environmental dimension at any point in time. When looking at the various 
corporate sustainability subcategories (a1 to b3 – as described in the Appendix), it is evident that they are 
more widely dispersed around their corresponding mean score values as they are characterized by higher 
standard deviations and more extreme minima and maxima. On the other hand, borrower country 
sustainability scores are, on average, higher compared to firm sustainability scores, ranging between 2.547 
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(country environmental performance) and 3.169 (country social performance), and low respective 
standard deviations of 0.243 and 0.298. This is unsurprising as we would expect that these sociocultural 
and institutional sustainability frameworks change only very slowly at the country level and thus the 
dynamic variability of these variables in the sample by definition is low.  
In terms of financial characteristics, what stands out is that the average borrower is a profitable firm with 
a return on equity exceeding 24% per annum and looks to be in a good position to repay a loan as it has a 
relatively low leverage ratio (<0.3) and a high interest coverage ratio (median value of 5.08). As expected 
for a sample of this size and variability, the average beta is very close to unity, but the standard deviation 
of this variable exceeds 0.5, providing an array of firm-year observations with very different levels of 
systematic risk. The average free floating percentage is quite high (>76%). This is a desirable characteristic 
for our analysis, as it allows for market forces to have the defining role in determining corporate valuation 
through the analysis of financial and non-financial (including sustainability) information. Naturally, this 
valuation will also influence the terms of the loan agreement between lender and borrower, either through 
directly influencing the valuation of the collateral or by impacting the bank’s opinion of the borrowing 
firm’s financial potential. Lastly, it is worth noting that the mean value for the loan spread over LIBOR is 
approximately 125 basis points (1.25%)12 and that the median loan maturity is 60 months (5 years). 
We run all regressions at the level of loan facilities and average the values of lender-related variables13 in 
the cases of syndicated loans. We winsorize all financial variables at the 1% level in order to avoid 
inferences being driven by extreme outliers and apply heteroskedasticity robust estimators. The full 
                                                          
12 This spread is significantly higher than Goss and Roberts (2011), Nandy and Lodh (2012) and Kim et 
al. (2014) where it is, respectively, 101.5, 86.5 and 79 basis points. This comes as a direct consequence of 
our study making use of a sample that includes years of the global financial crisis where the cost of 
borrowing was higher. 
 
13 Unfortunately, we do not have access to the details of the contribution of each lender towards the 
agreed loan amounts in order to value-weight variables according to the respective percentages. Hence we 
use arithmetic averages instead. 
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specification of our model makes use of all the variables we have previously mentioned, and in its generic 
form can be written as:  
, , 1 , 1
, 1 , 1 , 1
( ) ( _ , _ _ ,
_ , _ , _ ,
_ _
i t i t i t
i t i t i t
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It must be noted that to conduct all our analyses, we use different versions of firm and country 
sustainability metrics, starting from the overall scores, moving to the separate scores for the social and 
environmental aspects of sustainability and further down to the specific components of each of these. 
Thus we have multiple similar, but distinct, variants of the model described in equation 1. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Table 4 depicts the influence of overall country and company sustainability scores on bank loan credit 
spreads. In order to demonstrate the incremental explanatory power that different sets of variables have 
on loan spread variation, we start from a specification including solely sustainability factors and 
progressively move towards the full model specification. As can be seen in the first column of the table, 
sustainability scores can explain approximately 3% of the firm-year variation in the cost of bank loans, a 
small yet certainly not trivial part of the puzzle. Adding borrower characteristics increases adjusted R-
squared by nearly 10%, while adding lender and loan characteristics and the GDP growth rate of the 
borrower’s country leads to a further increase of 22%. Lastly, including a series of binary variables that 
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capture country, industry and time effects leads to a model specification that can explain almost half 
(48.3%) of the variation in loan spreads in our sample.14  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The most important finding manifesting from this set of results is that country sustainability is clearly 
shown to have a negative impact on the cost of bank loans, statistically significant at the 1% level, 
regardless of the set of control variables used. The sign, size, and significance of the respective slope 
coefficients are remarkably stable. Hence, Hypothesis 1 receives strong support. On the other hand, 
Hypothesis 2 is not supported, as corporate sustainability appears to be positively connected to credit 
spreads, but this result becomes insignificant when including the full set of control variables in the model. 
In addition, the overall firm sustainability slope coefficient is consistently lower than that for country 
sustainability. In a nutshell, in the fully specified model, the overall country sustainability framework 
appears to have a significant cost-reducing effect when it comes to direct financing. More specifically, an 
increase in Oekom country scores by one unit leads to an average decrease in bank loans spreads by 
0.642% in our sample.15 In contrast, the impact of a multidimensional CSR metric is not evident in our 
                                                          
14 As an aside, when we remove from our full model (Model 4 on Table 4) the corporate and country 
sustainability metrics but keep all the other independent variables, the adjusted R-squared drops from 
48.32% to 47.11%, indicating a marginal explanatory power of the sustainability variables of 1.21%. This 
may seem small but it is actually a very powerful result. For comparison, when we remove the borrower’s 
Z-score from the model instead (a standard financial distress variable that intuitively should be strongly 
related to credit spreads and, indeed, is found to be highly significant in our models), the adjusted R-
squared falls to 47.91%, indicating a marginal explanatory power for score of just 0.41% − about one-
third of the incremental explanatory power that the sustainability scores have.  
 
15 Because the dependent variable is log transformed, the economic significance of the slope coefficients 
is not immediately evident. We can easily calculate that a unit increase in country sustainability scores 
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analysis. The relevant coefficient is not significant at standard confidence intervals and it is less than one 
third of the size of the country sustainability slope coefficient.  
It is also reassuring that from the extensive array of control variables used, those that are shown to have a 
statistically significant impact on corporate loan spreads do so in the manner we would anticipate 
according to basic financial theory and common sense. Firms with strong fundamentals, lower leverage, 
higher profitability, fewer indications of financial distress, and higher credit ratings, and which borrow for 
shorter periods of time manage to gain access to cheaper bank loans compared to their peers with the 
opposite characteristics.  
 
Table 5 focuses on the nature of the effects of sustainability on credit costs by separately looking at the 
social and environmental components for both borrowing corporations and their countries. We also 
provide the model specifications that include only borrower characteristics to examine whether the 
previously noted increase in explanatory power is maintained when moving to the full specifications. 
Indeed, this increase is approximately 13% with an overall R-squared being in the vicinity of 50% in the 
case of both the social and environmental dimensions. The interest-lowering effects of country 
sustainability are verified and appear to be coming from both dimensions. The respective coefficients are 
negative and significant at the 1% level, although the economic magnitude of a change in the country 
environmental scores on loan spread is much larger than the impact of an equal change in the country 
social scores: a unit increase in the environmental dimension leads to an average decrease of the cost of 
loan by approximately 73 basis points compared to 48 for the same increase in the social dimension. 
These findings are in line with our a priori expectations that led to the formation of Hypothesis 3. Also, 
similar to previous indications is that firm-level environmental sustainability appears to be unrelated to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(which is a very significant change) leads to a reduction of loan spreads by 52% from their previous levels 
or approximately 64 basis points for the mean loan spread in the sample (which stands at 125 basis points 
over LIBOR). 
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the cost of bank loans, whereas social scores at the firm level are seemingly positively connected to credit 
spreads. Although the relevant coefficient is much lower in absolute terms compared to the ones related 
to country sustainability (a unit increase in the social part of firm sustainability leads to an average 
increase in loan rates of 0.38%) and is only significant at the 10% level, the finding is still contrary to our 
original hypothesis. One possible interpretation comes from the works of Clarkson (1995) and especially 
Hillman and Keim (2001). Clarkson (1995) makes the distinction between primary and secondary 
stakeholders stating that it is maintaining solid strategic relationships with the former group that is crucial 
to ensure the financial well-being of the firm. Hence, investments targeting secondary stakeholders may 
be deemed to be a misappropriation of scarce corporate funds. Hillman and Keim’s (2001) analysis 
empirically tests this conjecture as it pertains to CSR and concludes that “using corporate resources for 
social issues not related to primary stakeholders may not create value for shareholders” (p.125). This may 
explain why we find a modest positive association between the social dimension of corporate 
sustainability and cost of debt. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In order to further explore the key characteristics of the links between sustainability and cost of bank 
loans we have already identified, we make our analysis more fine-grained and use the three Oekom 
subdimensions as our key independent variables. For the social dimension, at the corporate level, these 
correspond to “staff and suppliers,” “society and product responsibility,” and “corporate governance and 
business ethics,” while at the country level they refer to “political system and governance,” “human rights 
and fundamental freedoms,” and “social conditions.” For the environmental dimension, the corporate-
level subcategories are “environmental management,” “products and services,” and “eco-efficiency,” 
whereas the country subcategories fall under “natural resources,” “climate change and energy,” and 
“production and consumption.” The results produced by these three analyses are captured in Table 6 and 
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provide us with a very clear picture. Every subdimension of country sustainability is shown to be 
associated with lower costs of bank loans (significant at the 1% level in every case), while all aspects of 
corporate sustainability are found to be insignificant determinants of credit spreads – hence the findings 
concerning the macro-sustainability effects on loans are corroborated while the indications of a positive 
link between the social part of CSR and loan interest rates can only lead to tentative conclusions. What is 
more, the economic importance of the environmental country sustainability factors is significantly greater 
than that of the respective social ones, judging from the size of the related coefficients. A unit increase in 
any of the components of social country sustainability leads to a reduction of the average credit spreads in 
the sample ranging between 46 and 50 basis points. The equivalent effect of environmental 
subdimensions amounts to approximately 76 or 77 basis points. Hence this segment of our investigation 
provides additional support for Hypotheses 1 and 3 but not for Hypothesis 2. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
As an additional set of analyses, we investigate the possible moderating role of the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in the link between sustainability and loan spreads. Lehman’s bankruptcy was one of the most 
crucial events within the recent global financial crisis and shifted the focus of the market “from estimates 
of write-downs, capital needs and merger and acquisition scenarios, to concerns about counterparty 
exposures and default risks.”16 Becchetti et al. (2010) outline the magnitude of the financial impact of the 
Lehman Brothers event and document that, after it occurred, investors better recognized the additional 
                                                          
16 Sandy Chen, analyst of Panmure Gordon and Co on Reuters: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/15/lehmanimpact-research-oppenheimer-
idusbng21779220080915 
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informational importance of CSR with regard to the moral character of the firm and its trustworthiness. 
Hence, it is possible that in the post-Lehman era, the influence of sustainability on financial contracting 
may have been strengthened. On the other hand, Lins et al. (2015) also investigate (in the US stock 
market setting) whether the financial crisis changed the market impact of CSR and find that high-CSR 
firms have crisis period returns significantly higher than those of low-CSR firms, but no similar return 
differential is detected before or after the crisis. To conduct a similar examination, we include an 
additional binary control variable taking the value of 1 for loan facilities starting after Lehman’s filing for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 and 0 otherwise, and interaction terms between this binary 
variable and Oekom firm scores. Although the binary variable is highly statistically significant and shows 
an increase in the level of corporate spreads after the event, the economic and statistical strength of the 
results concerning the impact of corporate sustainability on loans is extremely similar to that of our main 
results.17  
 
We also make an effort to check the sensitivity of the analysis to the use of the Oekom sustainability 
database. Unfortunately, we do not have another international CSR dataset at our disposal that we can use 
in order to see how the respective results would compare. Instead, we make use of the MSCI KLD 
STATS dataset. This is one of the most frequently used CSR sources in empirical research (as noted by 
Wood and Jones, 1995, and Waddock, 2003) but unfortunately covers only US firms. As in previous 
studies (e.g., Hillman and Keim, 2001; Kim et al., 2014; Oikonomou et al., 2014), we focus on the 
qualitative issue areas of interest covered by the KLD database. These are: relations with local 
                                                          
17 Alternatively, we also follow Lins et al. (2015) who define the financial crisis as the period between the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (September 2008) and the point at which the S&P 500 reached its lowest 
point (March 2009 − after which it started recovering) and split our sample to pre-crisis and post-crisis 
accordingly. We find no moderating effect of the crisis on the link between CSR and cost of loans at the 
firm level. Interestingly, though, the effect of country sustainability in decreasing the cost of debt is more 
pronounced from the point of the crisis and afterwards, i.e., the financial impact of country sustainability 
has strengthened. For the sake of parsimony, we do not include the relevant results in the paper.  
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communities, diversity in the workplace, employee issues, environmental considerations, and product 
safety. Each of these areas is assigned separate scores for indicators of strengths and concerns for each 
firm and each year. As is usual practice, we average the strengths indicators and detract the respective 
average of the concerns indicators for each issue area in order to produce scores for each. To make the 
analysis as analogous to when Oekom was used, we create an aggregate measure of firm CSR that is the 
average score across all five issue areas for a particular firm on a given year (Borrower_KLD_total). In 
addition, as no clear “social” score exists within KLD, we elect to create one by including employee 
issues, diversity, and relations with local communities under this umbrella term and averaging the 
respective scores (Borrower_KLD_soc). As mentioned, environment is separately considered within 
KLD so we have separate firm-year scores for this (Borrower_KLD_env). Our sample is, expectedly, 
smaller than before as it is geographically restricted solely to the US (N = 164). We repeat the previous 
analysis using the exact same set of control variables, with the exception of the “developing country” 
binary variable, which is of no use in this case. The results are depicted in Table 7. As can be seen, though 
the explanatory power of the model is even more significant than before (with adjusted R-squared in 
excess of 70%), the key independent variables that capture corporate sustainability are statistically 
insignificant. This corroborates the findings from the results produced when Oekom data were used to 
capture corporate sustainability.  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In our results so far, we have failed to find support for Hypothesis 2 about the link between sustainability 
and cost of debt at the firm level. One possible explanation for this is that for a firm that is truly 
financially robust, CSR many not be a crucially impactful factor, whereas for companies facing significant 
financial distress, the difference between poor and good CSR performance can have a significant 
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influence on their viability, default risk, and hence cost of debt.18 To investigate this possibility, we use Z-
score as the basic criterion to distinguish financially “solid” firms from “marginal” ones. Using the 
empirical distribution of Z-scores, we create two subsamples: one comprising observations in the lowest 
quartile (25%) of the distribution, with a Z-score value less than 1.16 (the relevant empirical in-sample 
threshold), which are facing high financial distress, and one subsample of observations in the top quartile, 
with a Z-score value more than 2.85, which are in high financial distress. We then repeat our core analysis 
on both of these subsamples and compare the results, which are shown in Table 8. Although we use the 
same set of control variables as in our main analysis, we do not report the respective coefficients for the 
sake of parsimony and in order for the reader to concentrate on the comparison of the coefficients of the 
treatment variables between the two subsamples. The results do not generally provide support to 
Hypothesis 2 as all but one of the coefficients in the subsample of firms in high distress are statistically 
insignificant. The exception to this is the a1 Oekom social subdimension, which is about corporate 
relationships to staff and suppliers. For this issue, there appears to be a robust negative link between CSR 
and cost of debt, at least for companies of precarious financial standing.19  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
                                                          
18
 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
19
 As an alternative robustness check, we also conduct quantile regressions of CSR on the cost of bank 
loans on different percentiles of the distribution of the bank loan spread. If the CSR-default risk link is 
mainly located on firms in financial distress, the coefficients of the treatment variables should be 
statistically significant at higher percentiles. We run the regressions conditioned on the 90th percentile of 
the dependent variable. Once more, all estimates are statistically insignificant and we fail to find support 
for Hypothesis 2. In addition, we plot the quantile regression processes in order for us to see how the 
estimates for the coefficients of corporate sustainability change when regressions are conditioned on 
different levels of the cost of debt. We would expect that the value of the coefficients algebraically 
decreases for higher percentiles. However this is generally not the case and, in addition, the confidence 
intervals widen (i.e., estimates are less statistically significant) at the higher percentiles. For the sake of 
parsimony, we do not report these results, but they are available upon request.  
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------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Finally, based on a recent study on the link between CSR and credit risk in the Eurozone corporate bond 
market (Stellner et al., 2015), we conduct additional exploratory analysis to investigate whether country 
characteristics or country sustainability play a moderating role on the effects of CSR on the cost of bank 
loans. We construct interaction terms by multiplying Oekom corporate scores (total scores, dimensional 
scores, and subdimensional scores separately) either with the binary variable distinguishing whether a 
borrower’s country is developed or developing, or with the Oekom country sustainability scores. We fail 
to identify any such relationship, as all relevant regression coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
It should be noted that the results of our study are directly comparable only to those of Kim et al. (2014) 
who also perform an international examination of the impact of sustainability on the cost of bank loans. 
Unlike them, we do not find evidence suggesting that higher firm-level sustainability reduces the cost of 
debt. However, we have clarified that there are two crucial differences between the two studies: (i) Kim et 
al. (2014) focus solely on the business ethics component of sustainability, whereas we look into overall 
sustainability as well as its various components and (ii) their sample stops in 2007, right before the start of 
the global credit crisis, which is reasonable to assume made lending institutions reconsider their policies 
and may have changed the corporate loan market framework. In contrast, our sample starts before the 
crisis, covers the entirety of its duration and finishes in 2012. In addition, both Goss and Roberts (2011) 
and Nandy and Lodh (2012) find that increases in overall CSR and firm environmental performance, 
respectively, can lead to average loan spread reductions of 7 to 20 basis points, at least in the US. Once 
more, the sample differences we have outlined between these studies and ours should be sufficient to 
reconciliate the equivalent results. The fact that our study is the first to include country-level sustainability 
scores as possible determinants of corporate loan spreads in direct financing makes these results 
impossible to compare with those manifesting from previous scholarly work. The same is true for the 
conclusions concerning the greater strength of the financial impact of the environmental dimension 
compared with that of the social dimension: Goss and Roberts (2011) use a multidimensional CSR 
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construct whereas Nandy and Lodh (2012) focus solely on the environment and Kim et al. (2014) on 
ethics.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We conduct an international investigation on the effects of corporate and country sustainability on 
corporate spreads of bank loans. We look into 470 loan agreements signed between 2005 and 2012 with 
borrowers based in 28 different countries across the world and operating in all major industries. Our 
principal findings reveal that country sustainability relating to both social and environmental frameworks 
has a statistically and economically impactful effect on direct financing. Higher country sustainability is 
associated with lower costs of bank loans. This conclusion is in line with the growing trend that 
recognizes the importance of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) macro-themes in the 
valuation of every asset class and type of financial contract.20 Issues such as climate change, resource 
scarcity, and rising and aging populations are tremendously impactful evolutions and their economic 
significance cannot be understated. Our analysis shows that the environmental dimension of a country’s 
institutional framework is approximately twice as impactful as the social dimension when it comes to 
determining the cost of corporate loans. The various subcategories of each dimension corroborate these 
findings with the environmental ones creating larger cost reductions in bank loans compared with the 
                                                          
20 Local Government Superannuation Scheme (LGS Super) in Australia has been innovative in 
considering these themes and creating asset allocation strategies that incorporate them. 
http://www.lgsuper.com.au/documents/Sustainability/L0126%20Global%20Sustainable%20Bonds%20
v4.pdf 
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social ones. On the other hand, we find no conclusive evidence that firm-level sustainability influences 
the interest rates charged to borrowing firms by banks. 
These results extend the academic literatures exploring (i) the determinants of bank loans, (ii) the 
empirical link between sustainability and financial performance, and (iii) the relationship between culture 
and economic behavior. It appears that, at least in the international bank loan market, country-level 
sustainability is priced while firm-level sustainability is not, or perhaps the latter is priced only through the 
former (which would lead to a reinterpretation of previous empirical findings). The role of trust and 
culture in economic decisions in agreements between contracting parties from different countries has 
been well documented (Botazzi et al., 2007; Licht et al., 2011; Giannetti and Yafeh, 2012) and it provides 
another possible way to interpret the findings of this study. The practical importance of these findings is 
especially significant for regulators and sovereign governments. It is these groups that have the power to 
transform the entirety of the sustainability framework in their countries, thus leading to lower costs of 
debt for corporations, cheaper undertaking of positive net present value projects, and, consequently, to 
higher rates of economic growth, increased employment, and prosperity.  
In spite of the contributions our study makes, it is characterized by several limitations, which provide 
opportunities for future research in this area. Firstly, the process by which Oekom assesses firm and 
country sustainability characteristics leads to the creation of a single rating and corresponding score. 
Although this is highly useful for empiricists, there have been voices that strongly suggest that 
sustainability (or CSR) issues should always distinguish between those that are related to positive and 
those that are related to negative social/environmental performance, as these are conceptually and 
practically different and so are their financial outcomes (Mattingly and Berman, 2006; Lankoski, 2009). 
Using alternative measures for firm and country sustainability that allow for this distinction to be made 
may shed additional light into what exact part of sustainability is priced in the international loan markets. 
Secondly, the main treatment variable in this study is CSR performance, but a case can be made that there 
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are similar links between CSR disclosures and default risk/cost of debt. This is another avenue worth 
exploring in the future.  
Thirdly, our study focuses solely on the impact of sustainability on the cost of bank loans. Although this 
ultimately is the most important part of the loan agreement between the two parties, there may be 
additional loan covenants that are associated with sustainability, and future research can investigate this 
possibility. Fourthly, though our study is international, it still draws data mostly from developed countries 
in North America and Europe. Given the increasing importance of developing countries, both from an 
economic and a global sustainability perspective, we feel that an analysis containing more data points 
from this part of the world would significantly enrich our understanding of the issue at hand.  
Lastly, it must be recognized that the inability to detect any significant link between corporate 
sustainability and cost of debt in our study may to some extent be attributed to our sample being 
restricted to mostly financially robust firms. If that is the case, then CSR may be viewed as only a 
peripheral issue by the lender(s) in respect to such healthy borrowers and not priced in the loan 
agreement (whereas the same lenders may otherwise seriously consider CSR as a risk factor for the more 
“marginal” potential borrowers and penalize them via higher loan rates). Future studies with access to 
both CSR ratings and loan term agreements for a broader set of borrowers (in terms of their generic 
credit ability) would help alleviate this concern. 
 
 
Appendix: Oekom Corporate and Country Rating Criteria 
 
Oekom Corporate Rating Criteria 
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Oekom uses over 100 social and environmental criteria, selected specifically for each industry, and 
covering six areas, to assess the social and environmental performance of a company and produce the 
relevant corporate ratings. The six areas of assessment are: 
 
Social Rating 
  Staff and Supplier 
  Society and Product Responsibility 
  Corporate Governance and Business Ethics 
 
Environmental Rating 
  Environmental Management 
  Products and Services 
   Eco-Efficiency 
Due to the different social and environmental challenges its industry is faced with, Oekom makes around 
one-third of these criteria industry specific. All criteria are individually weighted and evaluated according 
to their importance before they are finally aggregated into a single score. 
For more information: http://www.oekom-research.com/index_en.php?content=corporate-rating. 
 
 
Oekom Country Rating Criteria 
 
Oekom uses over 100 indicators to assess the institutional framework and the performance of a country 
across environmental and social dimensions.  
 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
38 
Social Rating  
Political System and Governance 
   Political System 
   Governance 
   Corruption and Money Laundering 
   Political Stability 
 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
  Safeguarding of Civil and Political Rights 
  Non-Discrimination 
  Gender Equality 
 
Social Conditions 
  Health 
  Education and Communication 
  Labor 
  Social Cohesion 
 
Environmental Rating 
Natural Resources 
  Land Use 
  Biodiversity 
  Water 
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Climate Change and Energy 
  Climate Change 
  Energy 
  
Production and Consumption 
  Agriculture 
  Industry 
  Transport 
  Private Consumption 
 
For more information: http://www.oekom-research.com/index_en.php?content=country-rating. 
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Table 1: Definition of Variables 
Borrower Oekom corp The aggregated Oekom CSR score for the borrowing firm 
Borrower Oekom social The  Oekom corporate score for the social performance of the borrowing firm 
Borrower Oekom env The  Oekom corporate score for the environmental performance of the borrowing firm 
Borrower Oekom a1 
The  Oekom corporate score for the “staff and suppliers” subdimension of the borrowing 
firm 
Borrower Oekom a2 
The  Oekom corporate score for the “society and product responsibility” subdimension of 
the borrowing firm 
Borrower Oekom a3 
The  Oekom corporate score for the “corporate governance and business ethics” 
subdimension of the borrowing firm 
Borrower Oekom b1 
The  Oekom corporate score for the “environmental management” subdimension of the 
borrowing firm 
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Borrower Oekom b2 
The  Oekom corporate score for the “products and services” subdimension of the 
borrowing firm 
Borrower Oekom b3 The  Oekom corporate score for the “eco-efficiency” subdimension of the borrowing firm 
Borrower countryOekom The overall Oekom sustainability score for the country of the borrowing firm 
Borrower countryOekom a The  Oekom score for the social performance of the country of the borrowing firm 
Borrower countryOekom b 
The  Oekom score for the environmental performance of the country of the borrowing 
firm 
Borrower rating 
Numerical value of the borrowing firm’s Standard & Poor’s credit rating orthogonalized by 
the respective Oekom score. When Standard and Poor’s rating is not available, Moody’s is 
used instead. 
Borrower beta 
Systematic risk of the borrowing firm. The respective major local stock index is used as a 
proxy for the market. 
Borrower freefloat Borrowing firm’s percentage of free floating shares 
Borrower intercover 
Borrowing firm’s interest coverage ratio calculated as earnings before interests and taxes 
over interest expenses 
Borrower mtb Borrowing firm’s ratio of market to book value 
Borrower r&d 
Borrowing firm’s R&D intensity calculated as Research & Development expenses over total 
sales 
Borrower roe 
Borrowing firm’s return on equity calculated as a proxy of earnings before interests and 
taxes over book value of equity 
Borrower ta Borrowing firm’s book value of total assets 
Borrower tdte Borrower'ing firm’s leverage calculated as total debt over book value of total equity 
Borrower zscore Borrowing firm’s Z-score according to Altman’s original measure of financial distress 
Current ratio 
Borrowing firm’s liquidity calculated as book value of current assets over book value of 
current liabilities 
Developing country 
Dummy variable taking a value of 0 when a country is classified as “developed” by FTSE 
and 1 otherwise 
GDP growth Borrowing firm’s country GDP growth rate in the year the loan facility was signed 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
49 
Lender rating 
Numerical value of the lending firm’s Standard & Poor’s credit rating orthogonalized by the 
respective Oekom score. When Standard and Poor’s rating is not available, Moody’s is used 
instead 
Lender ta Lending firm’s book value of total assets 
Loan maturity 
A calculation of how long (in months) the facility will be active from signing date to 
expiration date 
Loan spread 
Describes the amount the borrowing firm pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar 
drawn down. It is the logarithm of the sum of the spread of the loan plus  any annual (or 
facility) fee paid to the bank group. 
 
 
Table 2: Borrower Sample Characteristics 
Country Obs.   Region Obs. 
Australia 24 
 
America (ex. USA) 15 
Austria 3 
 
Asia-Pacific 56 
Bermuda 1 
 
Europe 195 
Brazil 2 
 
USA 204 
Canada 11 
 
Total 470 
China 3 
   Finland 7 
 
  
France 78 
 
Industrial Classification Obs. 
Germany 30 
 
sic2 13 
Greece 1 
 
sic3 7 
Hungary 1 
 
sic4 195 
India 4 
 
sic5 130 
Indonesia 1 
 
sic6 36 
Italy 7 
 
sic7 38 
Japan 16 
 
sic8 10 
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Mexico 1 
 
sic9 41 
Netherlands 7 
 
Total 470 
Norway 2 
   Poland 2 
   Portugal 2 
 
  
Romania 2 
 
Loan Start Year Obs. 
Russia 2 
 
2006 38 
South Korea 8 
 
2007 110 
Spain 13 
 
2008 49 
Sweden 5 
 
2009 60 
Switzerland 18 
 
2010 63 
UK 15 
 
2011 110 
USA 204 
 
2012 40 
Total 470   Total 470 
 
 
 
 Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
  
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Borrower Oekom corp 2.180 2.228 3.091 1 0.363 
Borrower Oekom social 2.258 2.228 3.191 1 0.395 
Borrower Oekom env 2.093 2.139 3.378 1 0.471 
Borrower Oekom a1 1.803 2.081 3.750 0 1.112 
Borrower Oekom a2 1.720 2.065 3.270 0 1.056 
Borrower Oekom a3 1.947 2.151 3.905 0 1.222 
Borrower Oekom b1 2.039 2.572 3.692 0 1.241 
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Borrower Oekom b2 1.462 1.733 3.675 0 0.908 
Borrower Oekom b3 1.575 1.600 4.000 0 1.173 
Borrower countryOekom 2.858 2.950 3.379 2.518 0.243 
Borrower countryOekom a 3.169 3.254 3.678 2.571 0.298 
Borrower countryOekom b 2.547 2.571 3.123 2.193 0.211 
Borrower ta 72908073 33331764 795000000 1491483 114000000 
Borrower mtb 1.865 2.105 21.190 –126.050 7.951 
Borrower tdte 0.288 0.694 5.359 –154.813 8.375 
Borrower beta 0.980 0.944 3.533 –0.697 0.508 
Current ratio 1.215 1.121 6.134 0.298 0.595 
Borrower roe 0.245 0.256 23.098 –19.346 1.503 
Borrower freefloat 76.706 85 100 10 22.563 
Borrower intercover 39.322 5.085 12739.370 –27.579 589.712 
Borrower r&d 0.025 0.005 0.307 0 0.0490 
Borrower zscore 4.689 1.742 197.601 –5.640 17.872 
Loan maturity 48.953 60 342 2 33.451 
GDP growth 0.017 0.024 0.245 –0.060 0.028 
Loan spread 124.987 87.500 750 2 111.861 
Observations 470 470 470 470 470 
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Table 4: Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility on the Cost of Bank Loans 
Table contains pooled OLS regression coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. The logarithm of 
the 1% winsorized value of bank loan spread over the basis rate is the regressand. Key independent 
variable is total Oekom CSR score. Regressions are at the level of lender group for each loan facility 
and use different sets of control variables. Heteroskedasticity consistent estimators are applied. *, 
**, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
C 5.8924 4.7280 4.6964  5.2348 
 
(12.617)*** (8.867)*** (6.871)*** (7.362)*** 
Borrower Oekom 0.2498 0.4844 0.4829 0.2051 
 
(2.540)** (3.829)*** (3.307)*** (1.327) 
Borrower c.Oekom –0.6808 –0.6278 –0.6306 –0.7221 
 
(–4.373)*** (–3.497)*** (–3.041)*** (–3.619)*** 
Borrower ta - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
(4.931)*** (3.440)*** (0.953) 
Borrower mtb - –0.0162 –0.0096 –0.0067 
 
 
(–3.137)*** (–2.358)** (–2.049)** 
Borrower tdte - 0.0137 0.0079 0.0077 
 
 
(3.068)*** (1.980)** (2.139)** 
Borrower beta - 0.0609 0.0312 0.0738 
 
 
(0.642) (0.311) (0.693) 
Current ratio - –0.1680 –0.1660 –0.1237 
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(–1.831)* (–1.722)* (–1.305) 
Borrower roe - –0.0221 –0.0091 –0.0252 
 
 
(–1.303) (–0.538) (–1.908)* 
Borrower freefloat - 0.0050 0.0036 0.0017 
 
 
(2.618)*** (1.745)* (0.978) 
Borrower intercover - 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
 
 
(1.413) (1.701)* (0.038) 
Borrower r&d - –0.6795 –1.2479 0.0632 
 
 
(–0.618) (–1.161) (0.057) 
Borrower zscore - 0.0047 0.0071 0.0051 
 
 
(1.741)* (3.137)*** (2.179)** 
Borrower rating - –0.1784 –0.1380 –0.1208 
 
 
(–8.954)*** (–7.415)*** (–6.588)*** 
Lender ta - - 0.0000 0.0000 
 
  
(1.677)* (0.452) 
Lender rating - - –0.0675 –0.0096 
 
  
(–1.526) (–0.205) 
Loan maturity - - 0.0027 0.0038 
 
  
(2.362)** (3.173)*** 
GDP growth - - –4.8681 –1.8180 
 
  
(–3.230)*** (–0.562) 
Developing country - - - 0.2803 
 
   
(1.290) 
Industry effects - - - YES 
Time effects - - - YES 
Adjusted R-squared 2.95% 12.66% 34.71% 48.32% 
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Observations 1007 787 478 470 
 
 
Table 5: Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility Dimensions 
on the Cost of Bank Loans 
Table contains pooled OLS regression coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. The logarithm of the 1% 
winsorized value of bank loan spread over the basis rate is the regressand. Key independent variable is social 
or environmental Oekom score. Regressions are at the level of lender group for each loan facility and use 
different sets of control variables. Heteroskedasticity consistent estimators are applied. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Oekom score Social(1) Social(2) Env.(1) Env.(2) 
C  3.5358 4.6936 6.3466 6.0654 
 
(7.894)***  (7.080)*** (11.347)*** (7.829)*** 
Borrower Oekom 0.4278 0.2680 0.1674 –0.0318 
 
(4.565)*** (1.905)* (2.276)** (–0.316) 
Borrower c.Oekom –0.2397 –0.4888 –1.0104 –0.8842 
 
(–1.944)* (–3.224)*** (–5.401)*** (–3.596)*** 
Borrower ta 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(4.604)*** (0.779) (4.591)*** (1.003) 
Borrower mtb –0.0178 –0.0069 –0.0174 –0.0080 
 
(–2.635)*** (–2.134)** (–2.569)** (–2.599)*** 
Borrower tdte 0.0134 0.0075 0.0154 0.0084 
 
(1.974)** (2.133)** (2.279)** (2.423)** 
Borrower beta 0.0552 0.0611 0.0180 0.0404 
 
(0.716) (0.614) (0.235) (0.393) 
Current ratio –0.0765 –0.0843 –0.1756 –0.1040 
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(–1.048) (–0.963) (–2.340)** (–1.144) 
Borrower roe –0.0172 –0.0229 –0.0256 –0.0260 
 
(–0.596) (–1.730)* (–0.894) (–1.941)* 
Borrower freefloat 0.0070 0.0024 0.0038 0.0014 
 
(4.674)*** (1.345) (2.416)** (0.805) 
Borrower intercover 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.175) (–0.106) (0.481) (–0.326) 
Borrower r&d –0.8141 –0.2454 –0.3168 0.0958 
 
(–0.935) (–0.228) (–0.369) (0.087) 
Borrower zscore 0.0047 0.0054 0.0043 0.0045 
 
(2.362)** (2.349)** (2.207)** (2.021)** 
Borrower rating –0.1830 –0.1206 –0.1842 –0.1275 
 
(–12.083)*** (–6.703)*** (–12.318)*** (–7.425)*** 
Lender ta - 0.0000 - 0.0000 
 
 
(0.810) 
 
(0.202) 
Lender rating - –0.0619 - –0.0358 
 
 
(–1.329) 
 
(–0.790) 
Loan maturity - 0.0035 - 0.0035 
 
 
(3.082)*** 
 
(2.948)*** 
GDP growth - –2.3513 - –1.7231 
 
 
(–0.734) 
 
(–0.544) 
Developing country 
- 
0.2829 
 
- 
0.2766 
 
 
 
(1.316) 
 
(1.289) 
Industry effects - YES - YES 
Time effects - YES - YES 
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Adjusted R-squared 35.68% 49.19% 36.67% 49.46% 
Observations 588 470 588 470 
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Table 6: Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility Subdimensions on the Cost of Bank Loans 
Table contains pooled OLS regression coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. The logarithm of the 1% 
winsorized value of bank loan spread over the basis rate is the regressand. Independent variables are defined in 
Table 1. Regressions are at the level of lender group for each loan facility. Heteroskedasticity consistent 
estimators are applied. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Key Oekom variable A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 
C 4.7775 4.8317 4.7239 6.0968 6.0682 6.0849 
 
(7.931)*** (8.093)*** (7.629)*** (7.839)*** (7.736)*** (7.776)*** 
Borrower Oekom –0.0119 0.0643 0.0368 0.0034 –0.0222 –0.0069 
 
(–0.286) (1.321) (1.062) (0.095) (–0.470) (–0.180) 
Borrower c.Oekom –0.4537 –0.5094 –0.4604 –0.9525 –0.9307 –0.9413 
 
(–2.946)*** (–
3.363)*** 
(–
2.912)*** 
(–4.094)*** (–
3.930)*** 
(–
3.995)*** Borrower ta 0.0000 0 0000 0 0000 0.0000 0 00 0 0 0000 
 
(0.717) (0.293) (0.503) (0.250) (0.369) (0.316) 
Borrower mtb –0.0072 –0.0076 –0.0076 –0.0091 –0.0093 –0.0091 
 
(–2.421)** (–2.420)** (–2.439)** (–3.033)*** (–
3.084)*** 
(–
3.052)*** Borrower tdte 0.0055 0.0055 0.0058 0.0072 0 073 0 072 
 
(1.685)* (1.653)* (1.735)* (2.122)** (2.165)** (2.095)** 
Borrower beta 0.0660 0.0770 0.0777 0.0575 0.0523 0.0528 
 
(0.626) (0.739) (0.745) (0.549) (0.509) (0.495) 
Current ratio –0.0664 –0.0650 –0.0701 –0.0976 –0.0956 –0.0972 
 
(–0.731) (–0.727) (–0.768) (–1.076) (–1.053) (–1.074) 
Borrower roe –0.0157 –0.0131 –0.0151 –0.0190 –0.0193 –0.0190 
 
(–1.250) (–1.045) (–1.214) (–1.496) (–1.521) (–1.496) 
Borrower freefloat 0.0031 0.0031 0.0030 0.0021 0.0022 0.0021 
 
(1.802)* (1.781)* (1.709)* (1.230) (1.265) (1.222) 
Borrower intercover 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(–0.864) (–0.664) (–0.748) (–0.278) (–0.349) (–0.320) 
Borrower r&d –0.4624 –0.9729 –0.7559 –0.5646 –0.4643 –0.5018 
 
(–0.406) (–0.870) (–0.691) (–0.513) (–0.414) (–0.455) 
Borrower zscore 0.0051 0.0048 0.0049 0.0046 0.0046 0.0047 
 
(2.244)** (2.075)** (2.154)** (2.084)** (2.093)** (2.128)** 
Borrower rating –0.1195 –0.1116 –0.1144 –0.1151 –0.1171 –0.1162 
 
(–6.751)*** (–
6.386)*** 
(–
6.750)*** 
(–6.789)*** (–6.96)*** (–
6.854)*** Lender ta 0.0000 0 0000 0 00 0 0.0000 0.0000 0 0000 
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(0.943) (0.977) (0.998) (0.427) (0.405) (0.428) 
Lender rating –0.0736 –0.0760 –0.0739 –0.0612 –0.0605 –0.0612 
 
(–1.502) (–1.544) (–1.504) (–1.292) (–1.286) (–1.293) 
Loan maturity 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0035 0.0035 
 
(2.981)*** (3.007)*** (3.008)*** (2.967)*** (2.958)*** (2.953)*** 
GDP growth –1.88898 –2.09101 –2.22206 –1.81393 –1.72023 –1.83518 
 
(–0.589) (–0.652) (–0.694) (–0.572) (–0.54) (–0.579) 
Developing country 0.2122 0.2446 0.2473 0.2607 0.2514 0.2564 
 
(0.94) (1.065) (1.091) (1.139) (1.103) (1.122) 
Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R-squared 47.45% 47.78% 47.61% 48.48% 48.51% 48.48% 
Observations 470 470 470 470 470 470 
Table 7: Effect of MSCI KLD CSR Scores on the Cost of Bank Loans 
Table contains pooled OLS regression coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. The logarithm of the 
1% winsorized value of bank loan spread over the basis rate is the regressand. Independent variables 
are defined in Table 1. Regressions are at the level of lender group for each loan facility. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent estimators are applied. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Key KLD variable Total  Social/Environmental  
C 4.7817  7.0841    
 
(8.013)***  (9.013)***    
Borrower_KLD_total –0.3755  –    
 
(–1.151)      
Borrower_KLD_soc -  –0.3328    
 
  (–1.373)    
Borrower_KLD_env -  –0.0418    
   (–0.179)    
Borrower ta 0.0000  0.0000    
 
(1.380)  (1.458)    
Borrower mtb –0.0091  –0.0089    
 
(–0.617)  (–0.601)    
Borrower tdte 0.0076  0.0078    
 
(1.163)  (1.186)    
Borrower beta –0.1934  –0.1892    
 
(–1.503)  (–1.438)    
Current ratio 0.0295  0.0261    
 
(0.210)  (0.182)    
Borrower roe –0.2028  –0.2078    
 
(–1.614)  (–1.619)    
Borrower freefloat 0.0030  0.0029    
 
(1.055)  (1.029)    
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Borrower intercover –0.0011  –0.0011    
 
(–2.902)***  (–
2.895)*** 
   
Borrower r&d –0.5881  –0.6096    
 
(–0.617)  (–0.645)    
Borrower zscore 0.0614  0.0581    
 
(0.732)  (0.711)    
Borrower rating –0.1433  –0.1432    
 
(–4.306)***  (–
4.271)*** 
   
Lender ta 0.0000  0 0000    
 
(–1.017)  (–1.005)    
Lender rating 0.0467  0.0478    
 
(0.726)  (0.741)    
Loan maturity 0.0002  0.0003    
 
(0.082)  (0.114)    
GDP growth –19.4721  –18.5870    
 
(–1.119)  (–1.072)    
Industry effects YES  YES    
Time effects YES  YES    
Adjusted R-squared 71.62%  71.48%    
Observations 164  164    
Table 8: Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility on the Cost of Bank Loans when Sampling by Financial 
Distress 
Table contains pooled OLS regression coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. The logarithm of the 1% winsorized 
value of bank loan spread over the basis rate is the regressand. Key independent variables are oekom CSR scores. 
Regressions are at the level of lender group for each loan facility and use the same set of controls variables as in Table 6 
but their coefficients are not reported for the sake of parsimony. Heteroskedasticity consistent estimators are applied. 
“Low z” samples contain observations in the bottom 25% of the pooled sample according to Z-score and “High z” 
samples contain observations in the top 25% of the pooled sample according to Z-score. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Key Oekom variable Total 
 
Total Soc/Env Soc/Env A1–B3 A1–B3 
Sampling by z-score Low z High z Low z High z Low z High z 
Borrower Oekom corp 0.4165 –0.2805 - - - - 
 
(1.438) (–0.659)     
Borrower Oekom social - - 0.2396 –0.3908 - - 
 
  (0.877) (–1.268)   
Borrower Oekom env - - –0.0144 0.1249 - - 
 
  (–0.055) (0.265)   
Borrower Oekom a1 - - - 
- 
- 0.0580 –0.5796 
 
    (0.145) (–1.960)* 
Borrower Oekom a2 - - - - 0.1710 0.3060 
 
    (0.643) (0.584) 
Borrower Oekom a3 - - - - –0.2606 0.0686 
 
    (–1.654) (0.2764) 
Borrower Oekom b1 - - - - 0.0621 –0.0121 
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    (0.197) (–0.0342) 
Borrower Oekom b2 - - - - 0.0803 0.024 
 
    (0.319) (0.055) 
Borrower Oekom b3 - - - - –0.0224 0.1832 
 
    (–0.176) (1.287) 
Adjusted R-squared 55.11% 52.99% 56.57% 55.88% 56.02% 57.05% 
Observations 118 119 118 119 118 119 
 
